RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES.
A executed notes to B, a corporation, in return for the
exclusive privilege, within a certain territory, of vending a popNotice: Gross ular unpatented article. B, through its president,
NeM icc:
indorsed the notes to C, the plaintiff in the presBad Iaith
ent suit, in payment of a personal obligation due
from the president to C. There was no direct evidence that
C knew the nature of the consideration given for the notes in
suit, but there was much circumstantial evidence tending to
show that he had considerable knowledge of the business in
which the original payees of the notes were engaged, and of
the circumstances under which these notes were given. The
question as to whether C was a holder in due course was submitted to the jury, but only with this rigid instruction: that
if the plaintiff had notice of facts which would lead a prudent
man to investigate, and he neglected to do so, he could not be
a purchaser in good faith. (Kipp v. Smith, 118 N. W. 848.)
This instruction was reversed by the Supreme Court, or at
least modified into the ruling that gross negligence, while evidence from which bad faith might be inferred, did not in itself
constitute bad faith as a matter of law, thus following the line
of common-law decisions on the subject, as laid down first in
Lawson v. Weston (4 Sep. 56), and after a good deal of argument, settled finally in Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870).
In the absence of special statutes, gross negligence was not in
itself sufficient to deprive a holder of the right to recover,
and while possible evidence of bad faith, was not the same
thing. (Daniel: Negot. Insts. Secs. 5774-5.)
The present case was decided under the Negotiable Instruments Act, adopted in Wisconsin in 19o6 (Sanborn's St. Supp.,
19o6, 1676-26). One of its sections provides that "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument, or defect in the
title of the person negotiating same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or
defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking
the instrument amounted to bad faith.
The interpretation of the statute in the case in hand seems
(411)
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satisfactory from the view points both of history and convenience. The Law Merchant governing bills and notes was dictated largely by business convenience, and the common-law
idea of what notice was, was settled only after considerable
change and continual harping on what was considered a "logical" point of view; and was settled in the only way to secure
a free interchange of these securities. The idea of the Negotiable Instruments Act was not to change the law, but merely
to codify it and make it uniform, and hence it would seem that
the decisions under it should follow the common law under the
particular heading. A statute similar to the one in hand has
been interpreted in a precisely similar way in Massachusetts
(Mass. Bank v. Snow, 72 N. E. 959); and the rule is a good
one, since it relieves notes of the clog otherwise put on their
negotiability, and presents the clear and intelligible question of
good faith for consideration by the jury, whereas to leave it
to a jury to determine as to the degre of caution which a prudent man should exercise, would lead to great perplexity and
frequent injustice.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
That the Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to
make general investigations, on its own motion, of all the acts
and incidents of interstate commerce, and that
Power of
Interstate
Congress could not constitutionally delegate to it
Commerce
such power, is decided in Harrimanv. Interstate
Commission
Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407.
(For a full discussion see note, p. 399 of this issue.)

CONTRACTS.
Under an agreement to thresh all defendant's grain at so
much per bushel, plaintiffs threshed part of it, and then refused to thresh the remainder, and now sue on a
Entire Contract, Part
quantum meruit. Held, where there has been an
Perfornmnce
intentional failure to complete the contract, or a
departure so substantial as to be incapable of a remedy, there
can be no partial recovery.-Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, 118 N. V.
R. 797.
d(Minn.)
While the doctrine here announced is supported by the
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weight of Minnesota authority (See: Kriger v. Lippel, 42
Minn. 6) and has in that state been extended even to the case
of building contracts, where the variations are too substantial
for the owner to be compensated in damages, as in Hoglund v.
Sortedahl, IOI Minn. 359, yet the rule is by no means universal. In the case of Jordan v. Fitz, 63 N. H. 227, the facts were
almost identical with those of the principal case, and the Court
allowed a recovery on a quantum reruit;and again in McMil0OO4(Iowa) the facts were
lan v. Malloy, in 4 N. W. R.
identical, even to the contract being for the threshing of grain,
and the plaintiff was allowed to recover the amount agreed on
by the contract, less the damage sustained by the defendant.
The law in Pennsylvania, on the other hand, supports the view
of the principal case, and allows no recovery for partial performance where the abandonment was wilful: Gillespie Tooi
Co. v. Wilson, 123 Pa. I9, and this was the old common law
rule. The conflict appears to have been caused by the different
standpoints from which the courts view such actions. Some
consider that allowing a partial recovery encourages breaches,
while the other authorities consider it only equitable for a man
to pay for what he has received, and cannot return.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of Weed
v. Spears, 86 N. E. io, refused to allow a surety to collect
from his co-surety the amount of a note paid by
to Perform
him which, according to the terms of an agreeand Eisting
UsbUity

ment formed by the sureties among themselves,
was to have been paid by the defendant.

(For a full discussion of the principle involved, see note,
p. 4o4 of this issue.)
In Zemfel v. Hughes et al., 85 N. E. 641, the Supreme
Court of Illinois decided that, where the vendor prevents the
performance within the stipulated by the vendee,
Time No Es.
senc of Con. he cannot take advantage of the provision as to
trat
performance within a certain time, in order to
rescind the contract.
(For a full discussion see note, p. 4o8 of this issue.)
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CORPORATIONS.
A corporation borrowed money from its stockholders several times, and as an additional incentive to the loan, advanced
shares of new stock to the par value of one-half
Unpad Subsriptlons:
the money advanced to the corporation, though
lghtofetoff

notes had already been issued to cover the amount.

Shortly afterward the aggregation stopped doing business, and
a creditor of the concern sued the stockholders for the amount
due from them to the company on account of their unpaid
shares. The defendants were allowed to set off, in the action,
the amount owed them by the corporation on the notes issued
to secure the loan. (Austin Powder Co. v. Commercial Lead
Co., 114 S. W. 67.) The obligations mentioned accrued on
account of the advancements made while the company was still
a going, but embarrassed concern, and it was not contended that
the obligations of the company to the individual stockholders
were tainted by fraud or bad faith.
The American courts have held uniformly that the capital
stock of a corporation and its other property are to be deemed
a trust fund for the payment of debts of the corporation, so
that the creditors have a lien upon, or right of priority of payment out of it, in preference to any of the shareholders of
the corporation. (Sawyer v. Hoag, V7 Wall. 6, o.) This
trust fund includes unpaid subscriptions for shares. (Washburn v. Green, 133 U. S. 30; Sawyer v. Hoag, supra.)
M.-:-y jurisdictions have refused the stockholder, in a suit
against him by the creditor of the corporation on his unpaid
subscription, the right to set off a debt due him from the corporation. (In re Empire City Bank 8 Abb. Prac. 192.) But the
Missouri courts have consistently allowed this practice, beginning with the case of Webber v. Leighton, 8 Mo. App. 5o2
and followed up by Coquard v. Prendergast (35 Mo. App.
148) and Jerman v. Benton (79 Mo. 148).
The reason given for allowing the set off is this: If a defunct corporation is indebted to a holder of unpaid shares,
the latter should enjoy the same facilities for obtaining satisfaction of his debt that any other creditor has, and is not to
be discriminated against by permitting a judgment creditor to
collect his demand in full out of the shareholder's liability on
his shares. The two kinds of creditors are thus put on an
equal footing as regards obtaining priority of satisfaction out
of the assets of the company, and their success made to depend
upon their comparative diligence. As the holder of unpaid
shares cannot proceed against himself for satisfaction of his
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claim, his liability is an asset of the company which is not accessible to him by statutory remedy; and hence his equality
with other creditors ought to be protected, as regards said
asset, by allowing him to set off any debt the company owes
him, if another creditor seeks satisfaction from him.

CRIMES.
Upon an information for obtaining money by false pretenses, from one Mayer, it was proved that the money obtained from Mayer belonged to one Freedman,
of whom Mayer was the agent. Held: Ownerease prdthe
ship is a material averment in an indictment for
mert: To
Whom
as laid. The
false pretense and must be proved
Money Obnot the crime
crime, if any was proven, 98was
taieo Must
Pac. (Wy.) 709.
charged. Martins v. State,
elog
The wording of the Wyoming statute is, "obtain from any
other person any money &c., with intent to cheat or defraud
any such person of the same." There is no express provision
that the party from whom the property is obtained must, in
fact, be defrauded. However, statutes of this kind have universally been construed as requiring that element to constitute
the crime of false pretense (Owens v. State, 83 Wis. 496;
People v. Behee, 9° Mich. 353; Jacobs v. State, 31 Neb. 33),
and that is the effect of the above decision; for, if the property obtained did not belong to Mayer, he was not defrauded.
In other words, since the prosecution failed to prove the ownership alleged, they failed to prove the crime as alleged under
the statute.
That being the case the question immediately arises, was
the prisoner guilty of any crime. He could certainly not be
convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses from Freedman, as the false pretenses were not made to him. Could he
be convicted under an indictment for obtaining by false pretenses from Mayer, money, the property of Freedman, with
intent to defraud Freedman? The wording of the statute,
requiring that the intent be against the person from whom the
property is obtained, would seem not to include such a state
of facts. But it is said in Bishop on Criminal Law (Vol. 2,
§ 473), in speaking of the intent, pretense and fraud necessary
to constitute false pretense, "there seems to be no necessity,
that, as a universal rule they (i. e., the above elements), should
operate severally against the same person." Commonwealth
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v. Call, 38 Mass. 515, is sighted in support of
and amply bears it out. However, the wording
chusetts statute does not seem to require that
the fraud be against the person from whom
obtained.

this statement,
of the Massathe intent and
the money is

In the case of Michael v. Bacon, 63 S. E. 228, the plaintiff
was an employe of the defendant and had the following statement published in a newspaper: "Mr. Bacon was
Crimial L
bel: Province about to appoint McC. Hill sfiperintendent of his
factory when we, claiming that Hill was a scab,
of Court and
struck. Whereupon Bacon stated that he would
Jury
under no circumstances appoint Hill and so we went back to
work. Later, Bacon posted a bulletin stating that Hill had been
appointed and each of us as we read it quietly quit work,
because as Mr. Bacon had not lived up to his promise, we could
not see our way clear to work under a scab."
The Court held, that the question whether the words were
criminally libellous was one of fact for the jury and that a
jury might reasonably find in this case that the publication
in substance charged that the defendant was a liar and might
find that td accuse a man of lying to his employes was imputing
dishonesty to him.
The provinces of judge and jury in cases of libel have
been very clearly defined in the case of Commonwealth
v. Wolfinger, 7 Kulp. 537, where it was held, that it it is
for the judge to decide whether a publication is capable of
the meaning ascribed to it by an innuendo, and for the jury
to determine whether such meaning is truly ascribed to it. In
our principal case the Court was correct in holding that it was
for the jury to decide whether words are libellous, but no court
seems to have gone so far as to hold that the words above,
which merely charge a man with breaking an agreement or
promise, could be so construed as to be criminally libellous.
EQUITY.
Defendant indorsed a corporation certificate of indebtedness in blank, and delivered it to his broker to sell. The broker tortiously pledged it with the plaintiff as secur,
Bn, to
ity for an antecedent debt, and the plaintiff later
Tr=afr of
Stock
accepted it in part payment of the debt. Plaintiff
now brings his bill to compel a transfer on the books of the
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company, and to enjoin the defendant from claiming the 'certificate. Held, the title passed by delivery of the certificate
with power of attorney indorsed in blank, even though the
by-laws of the company provided to the contrary; and the
defendant was estopped from claiming that his broker was
not an assignee for value.-McCarthy v. Crawford, 86 N. E.
R. 750 (Ill.).
There are two distinct theories on each of which the decision of the Court can be sustained. The Court, however, has
confused both theories, while incorporating both in its conclusions. In the first place, if it be determined that a good
legal title is passed by a blank indorsement without transfer
on the company's books, then the plaintiff in this case gains
title from the fact that he was a purchaser for value without
notice from a trustee of the legal title, and this rule is well
settled: Pilcher v. Rawlins, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 259. Iu this
connection, however, there has been some doubt as to whether
indorsement without transfer does pass a valid title. (Weale
v. Ollive, 17 Beav. 252.) On the other hand, the decision may
rest on the theory that the defendant, by clothing his trustee
with the indicia of title, is estopped from denying the plaintiff's title, who has purchased for value. This theory is sparingly applied, and does not extend to cases of mere bailments
of choses in action, Midland Co. v. Hitchcock, 37 N. J. Eq.
549; yet in England has been applied to the deposit of title
deeds; See: Lloyd's Banking Co. v. Jones, 29 Ch. Div. 221.
Under the estoppel doctrine, however, it .must be noted that
value is essential, i. e., the purchaser must have altered his position as a result of the deceit; so that if the plaintiff in the case
at bar had continued to hold the certificate merely as collateral
for the antecendent debt, he could not have invoked the doctrine of estoppel. But since he accepted the certificate in part
payment of the debt, thereby releasing so much of the debt,
and before notice, his position was altered. The two theories
are quite distinct, but as each would here lead to the same
conclusion, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not the
Court was correct in holding that the broker obtained the legal
title; though probably the weight of authority is in accord
with the Court's view: Kiddell v. Farrell3 Sm. & G. 428.
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Where an injunction, if granted, would injure a great industry and a large community, and benefit only the plaintiff,
Hill
Bunker
McCarthy
.
be refused:
,,f
a o: it
andshould
Sullivan
Mining Co.,
164 Fed.v.927
ULM

a full dicussion see note, p. 396 of this

"(For
issue.)

EQUITY PLEADING.
Complainant, a gas company, brought .abill against a city
and its officers, to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance,
alleged
Mu- fixing the price to be charged for gas, and
A temporary decree isAgainst Mu- to be unconstitutional.
sued including all the customers of the complain11,autnd
ant, although not parties to the record. San Fran-

cisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 164 Fed. 884.
The general rule in Courts of Equity is, that all persons
materially interested in the subject matter of a suit must be
made parties. Story, Eq. P1. ioth ed. § 172. There are two
reasons for this rule; first, the prevention of a multiplicity of
suits, and second, the accomplishment of justice, by avoiding
making a decree, affecting the rights of any persons who have
not had an opportunity to be heard. Hallet v. Hallet, 2 Paige
R. (N. Y.) 15. This rule, however, is not enforced in cases
where it would defeat its own end. So we find three well
defined exceptions to it, where the parties are too numerous
to allow of being joined. These are (i), where the question
is one of a common or general interest, and one or more sue
or defend for the benefit of the whole. (2) Where the parties form a voluntary association, and those who sue or defend many fairly be presumed to represent the rights or interests of the whole. (3) Where the parties are very numerous, and although they have separate interests, yet it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court. In this last
case there is usually a privity of interest between the parties,
although that is not strictly necessary under the decisions.
The principal case comes within the last-named exception and
is typical of a large class of similar cases in which the constitutionality of gas or water ordinances is questioned. Smith
v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 303; Gas & Light Co. v. Memphis,
72 Fed. 952. The rights of the consumers, while separate, are
analagous and can fairly be represented by the City, the largest consumer. Then a decree embracing them will prevent
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a multiplicity of suits against the complainant, while the constitutionality of the ordinance is being determined.
This practice of allowing a municipality to represent its citens and tax-payers is further justified by the view, expressed
in Freeman on Judgments, § 178, that the position of a municipality towards its citizens is, upon principle, analagous to
that of a trustee towards his cestuis qui trustent.

EVIDENCE.
The jurist is yet to be found who can give an adequate
definition of reasonable doubt-a definition that shall be concise and accurate, and yet at the same time suffiDelton of
ciently comprehensive to enlighten properly the
Reaonable
Doubt
not over-ready minds of the "peers" who try us.
The District Judge of a court in Oklahoma recently attempted
the matter, but with rather unfortunate results. "The term
reasonable doubt," he charged the jury, "means a doubt which
has some good reason for it, arising out of the evidence in the
cause; such a doubt as you are able to find in the evidence or
lack of evidence, a reason for." This was held a reversible
error by the appellate body. (Price v. State, 98 Pac. 447.)
The definition just quoted was certainly such as to be
prejudicial to a defendant, but those quoted by the leading
text-writers seem equally unfortunate for presentation to a
jury because of their circumlocution in an effort to be
exact. Best in his Criminal Evidence, Par. i95 defines the
matter thus: "Guilt must be essentially connected with facts
proved so as to flow from them by a species of moral necessity. In other words, conviction must not be founded on suspicion, or even a preponderance of evidence, on the side of
delinquency to the accused, but must be based on such a moral
certainty of his guilt, as, if not sufficient to destroy all contrary hypotheses, shall at least reduce them within the limits
of physical possibility;" and then recognizing the futility of
it all he adds---"the nature of this certainty is, however, more
easily conceived than defined," so that he has to resort to
something outside his elaborate definition after all, and is
back at his starting-point.
Perhaps the least unsatisfactory statement of the case is
the famous one by Shaw, C. J., in Coin. v. Webster (5 Cush.
295) : "The term (reasonable doubt) is often used, but not
easily defined. It is not a mere possible doubt; because every-
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thing relating to human affairs depending on moral evidence
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state
of the case which after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction
to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. It is not
sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong probability
arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged
is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence
must establish the truth of the facts to a reasonable moral
certainty; a certainty that convinces and. directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who
are bound to act conscientiously upon it."
This is exceedingly minute, but will not bear too close an
examination, since "reasonable moral certainty" is about as
obscure to average lay or even legal mind as "reasonable
doubt" and a later Massachusetts case tried to amend it by
adding that it was such proof as would satisfy the judgment
and conscience of a jury that the crime was committed by
the defendant, and so satisfy them as to leave no other conclusion possible. (Corn. v. Mosler, 118 Mass. I.)
It can be seen from these few specimens how unsatisfactory they all are. Each text-book writer is forced in the end
to resort to illustration. Perhaps the idea is indefinable accurately. At any rate the Judge knew whereof he spoke when
he said that the jury derived their impressions from illustrations for the most part, and that such illustrations were necessary where even an accurate definition, if such a thing could be
realized, might fail. (Hopt v. Utah, 121 U. S. 431.)
In a rather foggy opinion the Supreme Court of Georgia
sustained a demurrer to a petition against a railroad company, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
of suit not having been brought in the county where
gtln
Facts in pei-the defendant company had its principal office.
ti Judkk' White v. A., B. & A. Ry. Co., 63 S. E. (Ga.)
234.
From the report is is not quite clear whether the Court
considered, (I) that lack of jurisdiction appeared from the
petition, or merely (2) that jurisdiction did not appear from
the petition.
(i) If, in fact, lack of jurisdiction appeared from the petition, the demurrer was rightly sustained on that ground. The
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principle is well settled, that, when want of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from a complaint, that defect can be taken
advantage of on demurrer. Johnson v. Adams, 14 Hun. 89.
(2) But if jurisdiction merely did not appear, the Court
must have reached its conclusion in one of two ways: either
(a) by sustaining a demurrer to a petition which merely did
not allege jurisdiction, or (b) by taking judicial notice of the
location of the principal office of the defendant company,
thereby making lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appear from
the petition.
(a) If the Court sustained the demurrer merely on the
ground that the petition did not show jurisdiction, the case
must be considered as wrongly decided, and against the weight
of authority. Powers v. Ames, 9 Minn. 178.
(b) If the Court took judicial notice of the location of the
office of the defendant company, the case must be considered
an extension of that doctrine. In Baker v. L. & N. R. R. Co.,
67 Ky. 619, the Court expressly refused to take judicial notice
of a similar fact. Aside from this decision, which is in direct
contravention of the principal case, the decisions most nearly
in point are the following: Jackson v. State, 72 Ga. 28, where
judicial notice was taken of the name of a corporation chartered by the legislature; L., N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. McAffee, 15
Ind. App. 442, where the location of a particular railway station within a county was noticed; and G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co.
v. State, 72 Tex. 4o4, where judicial notice was taken of the
location of a railroad.
Although the corporation in the principal case was chartered
by the Secretary of State, under an act of legislature, that
fact would not justify the taking judicial notice of the location of its principal office, for that fact was not one determined by the certificate of incorporation, as was the name
of the corporation in Jackson v. State (supra). The ground
for taking such notice, therefore, can be only that it is part
of the fund of common knowledge of the locality, and the
situation of a railroad office is certainly a less generally known
fact than the location of a railroad station, or of a railroad.
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GAMING.
A was arrested charged with a violation of Section 351 of
the Penal Code of New York in that he received five dollars as
Pivate

et-

tIg Not
New York
Anti ab-

the result of a bet upon a horse race made at a
race course. On application for a writ of habeas
corpus, Held, that the Penal Code does not make
it a crime to receive a sum of money as the result
of a bet on a horse race made and accepted orally.

People v. McLaughlin, 113 N. Y. S. 3o6.
This case is interesting as being the first to construe the
Anti-Gambling Statute, the passage of which by the New
York Legislature last June caused so much excitement. The
decision seems sound as the effect of the new statute is merely
(i) to remove the statutory exemption of transactions upon
the race track [Laws of 1895, Chap. 570, §§ 17, i8] from the
operation of Section 351 of the Penal Code which prohibited
all bookmaking, poolselling, etc., "upon the result of any lot,
chance, casuality, unknown or contingent event whatsoever,"
and (2) to reduce the grade of the crime for infringement
thereof from a felony to a misdemeanor. The Penal Code
has never been construed to prohibit oral bets [People v. Snedeker, 175 N. Y. 57, 62] and there seems to be no reason why
a distinction should be made between oral bets on horse races
and other oral bets.
NEGLIGENCE.
The plaintiff was injured by being struck by a locomotive
of the defendant company at a grade crossing. The defence
was contributory negligence, but the plaintiff
Las.t C,
Ctmnce Doc.
claimed that, although he was negligent, the detrne
fendants' engineer had the last opportunity to
avoid the accident.
Held, the doctrine of last clear chance is not limited to cases
where the peril of the person injured has been actually discovered by those causing the injury, but extends to cases
where the peril could have been discovered by the exercise
of reasonable care on their part.

Nichols v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 98 Pac. 8o8.
The doctrine of the last clear chance is one of delightful
uncertainty. It is repudiated altogether by some courts, by
some it is confined to cases where the peril of the plaintiff
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was actually discovered [Wabash R. R. v. Jones, 163 Ill. 167],
and by others it is extended, as in the principal case, to cover
the situation where the peril of the plaintiff should have been
discovered. Again it is uncertain whether the doctrine goes
to the question of proximity of causation [Inland & Seaboard
Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551] or is a distinct limitation of legal liability, though in some ways the latter seems
the more satisfactory view. [21 Harv. Law Rev., 233, 238.]
The rule laid down by the Court in the case under discussion is but a paraphrase of the doctrine as stated by Shearman
and Redfield in their work on Negligence [5th ed. §§ 99, 483,
484] and is based on the well known case of Davies v. Mann.
[io M. & W. 546.] If the doctrine is to be accepted at all
it seems logical to carry it to the limits laid down by the Court
in the principal case, as its fundamental basis, in spite of the
language used by some courts [C., C. C. & St. L. R. v. Turtt.
64 Fed. 823], seems to be the negligence of the defendant
in not avoiding the accident; and this may as well consist of
a failure to perceive the dangerous situation of the plaintiff
as in a failure to avoid injuring him after his peril is perceived.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
The Security Savings Bank was incorporated for the purpose of succeeding to the business and assets of the private
bank of the same name, previously conducted and
ver
To
managed by one Ellis, who was a stockholder
Aa% fd
L-Val
t
and president of the incorporated bank. The
corporation agreed to assume the liability of the
private bank in consideration of the transfer of the assets of
said private bank to the corporation. Among the assets transferred in pursuance of this agreement was defendant's note.
In a suit by the receiver of the incorporated bank on the said
note it was held that the note in the hands of the incorporated
bank was subject to a contemporaneous parol agreement between defendant and Ellis-the note having been given to
Ellis for the price of mining stock sold by Ellis to the defendant-by which the note never became an absolute obligation
in praesenti. Paulson v. Boyd (Wis. Sup. Ct.), 19o8, 118 N.
W. 841.
The Court appears to have been justified in construing the
agreement between the corporation and the private bank to
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mean that the new bank received the assets charged with the
conditions to which they were subject in the hands of the
private bank and constituting an express assumption of all
defenses to which they were subject in the hands of the former
owner. The corporation is more than the mere assignee of
the note; it stands, as regards it, in the shoes of the private
bank. It has been held where the members of an existing
firm formed a partnership with other parties and the new partnership took over all the assets (including some negotiable
notes, not yet due) of the original partnership, that the new
partnership was not an innocent purchaser for value before
maturity of said notes. [Stephens v. Olson (1895), 62 Minn.
295.]
This was a suit by the indorsee of a promissory note against
the maker. There was no fraud in the inception of the note,
and the holder had no knowledge, actual or conCollateral structive, of alleged fraud which induced the
curlty for Antecedent Debt payee to indorse it and transfer it to the La Tronas Constitut-

l-g Value

teriza Mining Co., and it was received in good

faith from said mining company, either as plaintiff contended, in payment of an equivalent amount of the
company's indebtedness or, as defendant contended, as collateral
security therefor; it was held "that any person to whom a negotiable security has been pledged as collateral would be a holder
for value to the extent of the amount due him." The Court
decided that Sections 25, 27 of the Negot. Instr. Act changed
the rule laid down in Maynard v. Davis 127 Mich. 571, (1901)
Graham v. Smith, 118 N. W. 726 (Mich. Sup. Ct., i9o8).
In accord with the law established in this case see Payne v.
Zell, 98 Va. 294 (i9oo); Brooks v. Sullivan 129 N. C. i9o,
(igoi) ; Mersick v. Alderman, et al., 77 Conn. 634 ('9o5).
The doctrine of the principal case would appear to be supported by parts of the opinion in Petrie v. Miller 57 App. Div.
17, P. 19 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. (i9oi); affirmed by Court of
Appeals without opinion, 173 N. Y. 596 (i9o3), and also
by Brewsterv. Schrader 26 Misc. (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 48o (i899).
The opinion in Petrie v. Miller, however, also goes on other
grounds. These decisions, so far as they relate to the
point decided by the principal case, have not been followed.
In Sutherland v. Mead 8o N. Y. App. Div. (Sup. Ct.), 103, p.
IIO (19o3) ; it was held that "merely taking such paper as collateral security for the payment of a pre-existing or antecedent
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debt does not constitute such debt value within the meaning of
this statute." This case has been followed in Pennsylvania,
Raken v. Henry, 16 Pa. Dist. R. 208; 64 Legal Intelligencer
146.
SALES.
Property was delivered by plaintiff to defendant, with the
agreement that defendant should pay the purchase price in inPant by .stalments, that title should remain in plaintiff till
Ittlwents
the last instalment was paid, and that plaintiff
should have the right to re-take the property upon
o atsf
the failure of any one payment. Defendant failed
in the payment of one instalment and the court held that the
plaintiff might elect any one of three remedies, (i) replevin;
(2) trover; (3)a suit for the purchase price. Fritschv. Wells,
86 N. E. (Mass.), 775. The third of these remedies is based
upon the theory that plaintiff, in a transaction of this kind,
may elect to regard the agreement as one of sale and delivery,
i.e., as a complete sale. It is difficult to see how this theory
may be supported in the teeth of the express agreement that
title shall remain in the vendor till full payment has been
made. Fleury & Co., v. Tufts, 25 Ill. 105, indicates that,
since the provision that title is to remain in the vendor is inserted solely for the vendor's benefit it is his to waive or not
as he sees fit. This agreement takes account only of the parties'
state of mind at the time of entering into the contract, not at
the time of breach, and does not, therefore, seem conclusive.
In sales on credit, where title is to remain in the vendor
till payment, the vendor's remedy for a failure to pay is
to re-take the goods; Drug Co. v. Teasdall, 52 Neb. 698.
These cases differ in only one particular from the ordinary
executory contract of sale, viz., the vendee gets possession
immediately; but this difference can have no effect upon
the question of passage of title. It is submitted that the principal case is really of the same class as Drug Co. v. Teasdall.
Upon breach of the executory contract of sale, the vendor's
remedy should be either a re-taking of the goods, an action for
damages, or an action for the payment of the particular instalment which has not been paid. Much confusion has arisen in
the cases through the various names which have been applied
to this transaction-"Conditional Sale", "Bailment", "Practically a Mortgage", etc. But in any event, it is evident that title
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has not passed up to the time of the breach; and there seems
no particular reason for giving the vendor an opportunity,
after breach, to force title upon an unwilling vendee.
Brown & Company sold to the plaintiffs goods to be manufactured by certain mills, for which they were the selling
Title to Goods agents. The course of business between Brown &
ri.mi,tured Co. and the plaintiffs was that upon receipt of inoP order 1
voices from the mills for the manufactured goods
when shipped, Brown & Co. would send invoices
of them to the plaintiffs and assign the right to receive payment
to a bank for advances made to Brown & Co.. sending it a
duplicate invoice. The invoice to the plaintiffs stated that
payment was to be made to the assignee. The goods were
shipped when finished without waiting for the complete order
to be finished. Plaintiffs paid the assignees the amount of
the invoices. Brown & Co. sent the load of goods in question
under this arrangement to the plaintiffs who stated that they
could not store them and requested that they be kept until plaintiffs could receive them. Brown & Co. stored the goods with
defendant and subsequently pledged the goods to defendants
for advances. Defendant's advances were made before plaintiff paid for the merchandise. Defendant refused to let plaintiffs have the goods unless they repaid said advances. Plaintiffs refused and replevined the goods. Held: That whatever
title Brown & Co. had, passed to the bank, when Brown & Co.
assigned to them the right to receive payment; Brown & Co.
holding the goods thereafter as bailees, so that their subsequent pledge of the goods to defendant was ineffectual. Judgment for plaintiffs. Schwab v. Oatnan, 113 N. Y. Suppl. 91o.
The Court did not decide whether Brown & Co. acted in
the transaction with plaintiffs as the agents of the mills or
independently. Neither does it decide whether the title to the
merchandise rested in the plaintiffs at the time of their receipt
of the invoices, or at the time of their payment to the bankers.
When an article is manufactured, and notice of that fact
is given to a party who has ordered it, it becomes the property
of the party ordering it, subject to the lien of the manufacturer
for the price. [Higgins v. Murray, 4 Hun. (N. Y.) 565
(1875).] Therefore, regarding Brown & Co., as the agent of
the mills, it is clear that no title passed to defendant.
If Brown & Co. is regarded as the vendor and plaintiff
as the vendee, the itemized invoice would seem to be a sufficient
identification to pass -title to plaintiff, if the vendors so in-
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tended. Therefore, if this was the intention, the transaction
of Brown & Co. with the bank must be regarded as an assignment to the bank of Brown & Co.'s right to receive the purchase price. [Tollerton & Stetson Co. v. Bank, 112 Iowa, 7o6
(19O0).]
But, if we regard title as not passing to the plaintiff until payment, it follows that regarding Brown & Co. as the vendors,
it had not passed out of Brown & Co. at the time of the pledge
to defendant, unless it had passed to the bank as security for
its advances, as, for instance, where a bill of lading is pledged.
[See Bank of Cincinnativ. Kelly, 57 N. Y. 34 (1874).] But
an invoice standing alone is never regarded as evidence of title.
[Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, p. 328 (893).]
Neither is it clear that the bank had a lien on the goods for
the collection of the purchase money. There can be no legal
lien without possession, except by a mortgage duly filed. [Taylor v. Perkins, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 123. See p. 126.] Possession
may be actual or constructive. However, a receipted bill of
parcels has been held insufficient unless the pledgee retain possession of the goods themselves. [Shaw v. Wilshire, 65 Me.
485, p. 492 (1876).] It is difficult to see how delivery of an
invoice without delivery of the goods or evidence of title is
sufficient to create a lien as respects defendant, who is a creditor of Brown & Co.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the violation of a
contract of lease. By a term of the contract the plaintiff had
the right upon payment of one dollar to surrender
Lack o. u.
tuty as a the lease for cancellation and avoid all liability.
Held, a court of equity will not do a vain and useDCIoZIC
less thing by rendering a decree settling the rights of parties,
which one of them may set aside at his will. Ulrey v. Keith, 86
N. E. R. 696 (111.).
The position thus taken by the court was first established
by Judge Cooley in the case of Rust v. Conard, 47 Mich. 449,
and in fact has nothing to do with lack of mutuality. The reasoning by which lack of mutuality is held to bar specific recovery in cases where there is an option to terminate, is equally
applicable to cases where there is an option to continue, whether
mutuality of obligation or mutuality of remedy is taken as the
test, and yet options to continue have almost universally been
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held not to constitute a bar to specific performance. (See A. L.
R., Vol. 49, P- 326.) The decision of Judge Cooley, supra,
however, brought in a practical, if not theoretical distinction
between the two classes of options. It is that in the case of
the option to terminate the plaintiff after securing specific performance from the defendant, can at any time render the decree
void by exercising his option. This theory was expressly repudiated in Pennsylvania, however, in the case of the Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210. Whether the weight
of authority will follow the Pennsylvania decision or Judge
Cooley's view remains to be seen. It certainly seems unreasonable that a distinction should be drawn between options to
continue, and those to terminate, on any other ground, though
the earlier case of Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U. S. 339, decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States, admits lack of
mutuality as a defence in case of an option to terminate.

SURETYSHIP.
One Scheffer had given to the plaintiff four promissory notes
of $9oo-each and had also as security given plaintiff an insurance policy on his (Scheffer's) life and agreed to
Duty of Cred.

itor to Secure pay all the premiums on the same. The defendants
collatera
curities in sHis guaranteed that the interest upon the promissory

notes should be paid until the principal was fully
paid. Scheffer paid neither the interest upon the
notes nor the life insurance premiums and so the policy lapsed.
Scheffer died and the plaintiff sued the guarantors for interest
due. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff should have
given them notice of the default of Scheffer and should have
paid the premiums upon the life insurance policy when Scheffer
failed to.
Held, that there was no duty imposed by law upon a creditor to take steps to prevent the depreciation of securities for
the debt in his hands. In this case there was no duty expressed
in the contract which required the creditor to pay the premiums and the law wouldn't imply one. Held, also, that creditor
does not have to give notice of debtor's failure to pay. Merritt
v. Haas, 118 N. W. 1023.
This decision seems to be in line with the principal decisions in most of the States. The cases have uniformly
held that a creditor cannot do anything that will cause
securities in his hands to depreciate, but there is no case
Hands
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which holds that he must take active measures to prevent
depreciation, nor is he even obliged to inform the debtor's sureties that the securities are depreciating or that the debtor has
defaulted. Upon this latter point see, however, Mayberry v.
Bainton & Bancroft, 2 Harr. (Del.) 24.

TRUSTS.
In Turpin v. Miles, 71 Atlantic, 44o, the Supreme Court of
Maryland re-stated the rule that where a conveyance is made
mpled Trusts to B and the purchase money is paid by C, a
andthe stat- trust arises in favor of C.
(For a full discussion, see note, p. 4Ol of this
uteof Frauds
issue.)

UNFAIR TRADE COMPETITION.
B brought suit in Cuba against a purchaser of a patented
article manufactured by A for an alleged infringement of his
(B's) patent, which had by a former decree of a
Injaoctfons
States Court in a suit between A and B
.-t.
-United
been declared invalid. A brings bill to enjoin B
foud Aed
Infingents from bringing suit against his customers in Cuba.
Held, that after the validity of a patent has been
of Patents
determined by final judgment in a suit for infringement, the
defeated party may be restrained by a decree in personarn from
bringing suits against the successful party's customers based on
the same patents, either in this or a foreign country. (The
Court, however, decided that the suit in Cuba was based, not
on the United States patent, but on a Cuban grant, and was,
therefore, not barred by a decree as to the validity of the United
States patent.) Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Tire
Wheel Co., 164 Fed. 869.
The principle that the malicious bringing or threatening of
suits against the customers of the patentee of an article for
an alleged infringement of a patent known to be invalid, will
be restrained as unfair trade competition in the nature of a
boycott, was first laid down in the leading case of Einack v.
Kane [34 Fed. 46, I888], and has been consistently followed.
Kessler v. Eldred, 2o6 U. S. 285 (19o7); Dittgen v. Racine
Paper Goods Co., 164 Fed. 85 (19o8); Farquhar Co. v. National Harrow Co., 1O2 Fed. 714 (1900).
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If the interference is bona fide, the validity of the patents
being undetermined, it will of course not be restrained. Kelley
v. Ypsylanti Dress Stay Mfg. Co., 44 Fed. i (189o).
These principles of unfair trade competition are so well established as to require no comment.

